Class v. Culture Wars in Iranian Elections
Juan Cole:
Some comentators have suggested that the reason Western reporters were shocked when Ahmadinejad won was that they are based in opulent North Tehran, whereas the farmers and workers of Iran, the majority, are enthusiastic for Ahmadinejad. That is, we fell victim once again to upper middle class reporting and expectations in a working class country of the global south. READ MORE.
A “working class country”? WTF does that mean? Iran is like the early Soviet Union? Somehow I missed the part where the proletariat took power…
Next sentence:
While such dynamics may have existed, this analysis is flawed in the case of Iran because it pays too much attention to class and material factors and not enough to Iranian culture wars.
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Though I agree that the term “working class country” shouldn’t be used…. ever.
Schools and universities in Iran have been closed for a few days, we’ve seen the Revolutionary Guard and other right-wing groups occupy newspaper offices the list goes on and on. Quasi-fascist is a stretch. The “quasi” part I mean.
I think he means a country where much of the population is working poor and not making an analysis of the “class nature” of the Iranian regime.
Here’s another contrasting opinion:
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/statistical-evidence-does-not-prove.html
All this like I said is irrelevant, it doesn’t matter whether the elections were rigged a little or a lot. The whole system is rigged and rotten to the core.
It’s interesting how important the students are in this situation. Though not that surprising considering the median age is 27. I particularly enjoyed this: http://advant.blogspot.com/
Perhaps this is a comment on the reform vs. confrontation question?
Glau makes a good point. It’s interesting to look at the demographics of many developing and/or authoritarian regimes. Generally speaking, the populations are very young, and unemployment rates are astronomical. There have been some very enlightening and scary academic studies illustrating the potential for violence when large numbers of unemployed young men have little to do-this often results in them joining gangs, militias, etc.(see: Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, etc.)
In a country such as Iran, some the same young men are the ones out on the streets opposing the streets. It is worthwhile to point out that the protesters in Iran aren’t ONLY men, but that is largely the case. Will be interesting to see if this demographic can actually be a force for positive change in the case of Iran, rather than merely a force for chaos.
In a system like Iran’s reform can only come about with confrontation. Actually the same is true anywhere, though the confrontation would obviously seem more civil in different places.
The protesters in Iran I presumed were men and women mostly from the educated strata, and Iran is normally a very depoliticized society. The events in Iran may be sputtering out, but it’s hard to compare a mass movement for change with gangs and militia movements.
In Egypt and other countries in the Middle East the point has been made that unemployment makes it almost impossible for young men to get married, and for this reason, and the more obvious ones, it draws these men towards one of the few vibrant parts of civil society–the mosque and Islamism. No need to guess what I think the counter to this is (this isn’t to say that Egypt doesn’t have a growing trade union movement).